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ARGUMENT 
1. Although the basic facts of the case are not in dispute, the Trustee disputes 
the characterization of the facts by the debtor in his opening brief. 
In Ronald K. Kunz' Opening Brief, in the section entitled "Statement of Material 
Facts," the debtor asserts that "the only change in his IRA during the year prior to the 
Petition Date was that Mr. Kunz switched the account's custodian from Merrill Lynch 
to Wachovia." Opening Brief of Debtor Ronald Kent Kunz p. 4. Such a statement is 
only partly true. In addition to the change of custodian, the following occurred: 
l)Ronald K. Kunz' individual retirement account at Merrill Lynch, account number 
260-84S84 was closed. 2)The closing of the Merrill Lynch IRA resulted in the balance 
in the account going from more than $20,000 to zero. 3) A new account at Wachovia 
Securities was created in the name of R. Kent Kunz, account number 4707-7518. 4) 
The value of securities and cash of the Wachovia Securities account on the August 2002 
Statement, as of July 31, 2002 was $0.00. See Wachovia Securities Account Statement 
attached to document #5 of the Index of Pleadings. 5) The closing value of the 
Wachovia Securities account at the end of the August, 2002 statement showed a value 
of cash and securities of $20,784.19. The above events show that more than just a 
mere change of custodians occurred. One account with one custodian was closed and a 
new account, with a new account number and a new custodian was created. 
The debtor also attempts to put words into the Trustee's mouth by stating that 
"Rupp filed an objection to Mr. Kunz' exemption of the IRA arguing that changing the 
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custodian through a rollover constitutes a new 'contribution' made within one-year 
prior to the Petition Date." Id. at 4. The Trustee has never argued that this transaction 
was a mere change of custodians. Such a characterization of Rupp's argument is 
misleading. A mere change of custodians would occur if, for example, the Custodian 
of an individual's IRA was bought-out by another custodian. If there had been no 
change of account, only a change of custodian, the account holder's account number 
would still be the same and the account holder would have never exercised any control 
over the funds. If the account were the same, there would have been no movement of 
the funds. Such a string of events would admittedly not amount to a contribution and 
transfer by the debtor. However, the foregoing is not the string of events which 
occurred in the case before the Court. Mr. Kunz withdrew funds from one account, 
moved those funds and deposited them in a new account with a different custodian; 
This was done by a rollover contribution. It still resulted in amounts being withdrawn 
from one account and moved to and deposited into another. Anytime the value in an 
account goes from zero to a higher amount an increase has occurred. In this case, the 
increase resulted because of the acts of the debtor, Ronald K. Kunz; The increase in the 
balance of the Wachovia Securities account occurred because funds were contributed to 
that account under the direction of Mr. Kunz. 
In his Objection to Exemption the Trustee alleged that the Wachovia Securities 
account (the new IRA) had a value "due to the contribution of securities . . . and 
cash." Index of Pleadings #5: Objection to Exemption and Notice of Hearing f 
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3(emphasis added). In response to the Trustee's assertion in paragraph 3 of the 
Objection and Notice of Hearing, that the value was a result of a "contribution" the 
debtor stated: "The Debtor does not dispute the facts alleged in paragraph 3 of the 
Trustee's Objection." Index of Pleadings # 7 or 8: Opposition to Trustee's Objection 
to Exemption 1 3(emphasis added). Thus, as the debtor admits, in his response to the 
Trustee's Objection to Exemption, the value in the Wachovia Securities account was the 
direct result of a contribution and should be included in the definition of amounts 
contributed in section 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii). 
2. Mr. Kunz' conclusion, that any other interpretation, besides the one that favors 
him, would be an "absurd result," is absurd. 
A common theme throughout Mr. Kunz' brief is that any interpretation, besides 
one that favors his own interests, would be absurd. This is despite the fact that Mr. 
Kunz admitted that the rollover was a contribution in his Opposition to Trustee's 
Objection to Exemption. Kunz now asserts that "[b]ecause the Utah Exemptions Act 
provides for specific exemptions by referring to the IRC, and because the IRC states 
that contributions to plans do not include rollovers as 'amounts contributed' the only 
clear explanation is that the phrase 'amounts contributed,' should not include rolled 
over amounts." Opening Brief of Debtor Ronald Kent Kunz, p. 6. The above 
argument is absurd, misleads the court and suggests judicial legislation rather than 
judicial interpretation. 
To support his reasoning Mr. Kunz references 26 U.S.C. §415(c). But, what 
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Mr. Kunz fails to bring to the Court's attention is the exact language referenced in 
Section 415(c). The only language supporting Mr. Kunz's assertion is found in 
paragraph (c)(2)(C) of Section 415 where it states: "For the purposes of this paragraph, 
employee contributions under subparagraph (B) are determined without regard to any 
rollover contributions . . . " 26 U.S.C. 415(c)(2)(C)(emphasis added). Mr. Kunz 
conveniently leaves out the fact that Section 415 uses the term "rollover contribution." 
Given the complete language of Section 415, the more logical explanation, when the 
Utah legislature refers to the ERC in one paragraph or sub-paragraph of Utah Code 
Ann. 78-23-5 and not in a separate paragraph or sub-paragraph of the same section is 
because the legislature had a reason to reference the IRC in one paragraph and not in 
the next. 
In addition to the above arguments, Mr. Kunz' interpretation ignores the plain 
language of the statute that creates an Individual Retirement Account, 26 U.S.C. § 408. 
Section 408(a)(1) plainly states: "Except in the case of a rollover contribution described 
in subsection (d)(3), in section 402(c), 403(a)(4) or 403(b)(8), no contribution will be 
accepted unless it is in cash, and contributions will not be accepted for the taxable year 
on behalf of any individual in excess of the amount in effect for such taxable year under 
section 219(b)(1)(A)." The preceding paragraph plainly includes a rollover 
contribution as a contribution to an Individual Retirement Account. In fact, the 
rollover contribution in this case squarely fits within the meaning of subsection (d)(3), 
referred to in section 408(a)(1). Subsection (d)(3) states: 
(3) Rollover contribution.-An amount is described in this paragraph as a 
rollover contribution if it meets the requirements of subparagraphs (A) 
and (B). 
(A) In general.-Paragraph (1) does not apply to any amount paid 
or distributed out of an individual retirement account or individual 
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retirement annuity to the individual I i * hose batch! (lie1 .11 < < unit 
or annuity is maintained if— 
(i) the entire amount received (including money and any 
other property) is paid into an individual retirement account 
or individual retirement annuity (other than an endowment 
contract) for the benefit of such individual not later than the 
60th day after the day on which he receives the payment or 
distributer 
(ii) the entire amount received (including money and any 
other property) is paid into an eligible retirement plan for 
the benefit of such individual not later than the 60th day 
after the date on which the payment or distribution is 
received, except that the maximum amount which may be 
paid into such plan may not exceed the portion of the 
amount received which is includible in gross income 
(determined without regard to this paragraph). 
For purposes of clause (ii), the term 'eligible retirement 
plan1 means an eligible retirement plan described in clause 
(iii), (iv), (v), or (vi) of section 402(c)(8)(B). 
[ ( M ) R e p e a l e ( 1 pubj; 10|, ; 1 3i 1 j- 1 1 1 j §§ 642(a) 
Stat.. 121] 
(B) Limitation.-This paragraph does not apply to any amount described 
in subparagraph (A)(i) received by an individual from an individual 
retirement account or individual retirement annuity if at any time dui"1; 
the 1-year period ending on the day of such receipt such individual 
received any other amount described in that subparagraph from an 
individual retirement account or an individual retirement annuity which 
was not includible in his gross income because of the application of this 
paragraph. 
26 U.S.C. 408(d)(3). Clearly Mr. Kunz' rollover contribution qualifies as a rollover 
contribute 
Merrill Lynch, Account No. 260-84S84 and were subsequently moved to and deposited 
into Wachovia Securities Account No. 4707-7518 within 60 days from the date of 
distribution. Second, no amount in the account was attributau 
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other than the rollover contribution. Finally, Mr. Kunz did not take possession or 
withdraw any of the rolled over funds within one year from the distribution from the 
Merrill Lynch account. Thus, according to 26 U.S.C. 408 Mr. Kunz' rollover will not 
trigger a taxable event, but is still considered a rollover contribution pursuant to Section 
408(a)(1) because amounts were contributed from one account to another account. To 
ignore this plain use of "rollover contribution" as it is used in the very statute defining 
an individual retirement account would be an absurd interpretation of amounts 
contributed, without further clarification or instructions from the legislature. 
If this Court determines that the above transaction does amount to a mere change 
in custodian then one must ask, where is the line to be drawn? The United States Code 
Section creating an Individual Retirement Account, 26 U.S.C. 408 allows a debtor 60 
days to rollover qualified funds and still qualify for non-recognition on his or her 
income tax returns. See 26 U.S.C.(d)(3)(A)(i). Is the debtor who withdraws IRA 
funds, deposits them in his own personal account and then redeposits them in a new 
IRA within 60 days of the withdrawal date subject to a different rule? The Trustee 
asserts that the latter transaction and the transactions before the Court should be treated 
similarly, each fits into the meaning of contribution as used in section 408(d)(3). 
3. Although the Utah Exemption Act is to be construed liberally in favor of 
debtors, such a liberal interpretation should not include following In re Allen, 228 
B.R. 132. 
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M r . Kunz places some emphasis mi In cr Mini
 tiJi\ llii l< I \ " in 1//1 ' nn 
parties d i s a # n v | d | as lo whether Al len 's direct transfers of the sums then in his IRA 
and SEP from one custodian to another . constitute 'contr ibut ions ' for the 
purpose"of the relevant Pennsylvania statute J ."".i" »•: illm., J"J""K H,K " 
(IIianki \\ I in II1  Ill'" I"11 • in lii i ase there is no such dispute, Mr . Kunz agreed in his 
Opposit ion to Trus tee ' s Objection to Exemption that the rollover was a contribution. 
See Index of Pleading 7 or 8: Opposition to 1 iustee s Objection to Exempli*' V 
I Iiilxvilliisfiiiiiliiif,11, I villi I ii mi " i u l m i . S N i m in be, farther differentiated. As 
background, Allen involved a dispute over whether a rollover from one IRA account to 
another IRA account constituted a contribution under an exemption statute similar to 
Utaiit • - - possessed instill regarding 
the legislative intent of the Pennsylvania legislature that does not exist in this case. The 
statute in question in Allen exempted from attachment or execution on a judgment 
"amounts contributed D ir 
before the debtor filed for bankruptcy." In re Allen, 228 B.R. 132, 134 (citing 42 
Pa.C.S.C. § 8124(b)(l)(ix) (Purdon's 1998). However, the Pennsylvania legislature 
amended this language "to make clear that said eKtvpiinn Mull n<>l include .MII "i(iiiii« 
directly rolled over from other fands which are exempt from attachment under this 
subparagraph.'" Allen, 228 B.R. at 134, fin. 2. The amendment went into effect after 
iebtor filed his bankruptcy, so the court was appiy 
me 14 Mi I iwcl flir ,ul\ iMifiit'r of knowing the legislature's intent regarding the application 
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of the statute, given the recent amendment. 
In addition, the Allen court did not differentiate between the two separate 
accounts involved, the account from which funds were withdrawn and the account to 
which funds were deposited. Instead the case focused on the change of custodians, 
ignoring the language of 26 U.S.C. 408 as it pertains to rollover contributions being 
included in the definition of contribution. Given the differences in Allen and the case at 
bar, the unique facts surrounding the timing of the Allen decision and the fact that Allen 
comes from a non-controlling jurisdiction, Allen clearly is not controlling precedent. If 
anything should be taken from Allen, it should be that the Pennsylvania legislature 
determined the need to change the language of the statute to specifically exclude 
rollover contributions because without such a specific exclusion in the statute, "amounts 
contributed" would include rollover contributions. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the debtor admits that the rollover from the Merrill Lynch account to 
the Wachovia Securities account was a contribution, the Internal Revenue Code section 
creating Individual Retirement Accounts includes rollovers as contributions and section 
78-23-5(l)(b)(ii) does not specifically exclude rollover contributions from those 
amounts included in the meaning of "amounts contributed," this Court should find that 
a rollover contribution at the direction of the account holder from one IRA to a new 
IRA is an amount contributed to the new IRA. Thus, the Trustee, Stephen W. Rupp 
respectfully asks this court to affirmatively answer the certified question - "amounts 
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contributed" includes rollover conli ilmliuiis. 
V-Dated this P day of November, 2003. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
0 * ^ «- £^» 
Jeremy C. Sink 
Attorneys for Trustee 
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